Sunday, July 30, 2017
\ADSS 1.280 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, notes
Reference: AES 3215/40
Location and date: Vatican, 10.04.1940
Summary statement: Dino Alfieri, Italian ambassador, complains about the attitude of L’Osservatore Romano which is promoting peace. Maglione defended the Holy See’s position and its freedom of expression.
The Italian Ambassador, on behalf of Count Ciano, and therefor of Mussolini, tells me that in many parts of Italy demonstrations and speeches in favour of peace are held in the churches, probably on the Vatican’s instructions.
Such demonstrations, in these days in which political events develop with a tremendous speed and while the Government tries to prepare peoples’ minds to be ready for possible developments, appear to be a peace at any price attitude in contrast with Government policy, which follows the vents with vigilant concern.
L’Osservatore Romano, a much read Italian paper, follows a different policy from that of the Italian Press in general; it should be more moderate in its statements and less long-winded and more impartial in reporting war news.
To these statements, the substance of which I have just reported, I replied as follows:
Please inform Count Ciano:
1. that the Holy See has not given instructions to intensify the alleged demonstrations in favour of peace, either directly or through the Bishops;
2. that there is no need to suppose that instructions have been given to explain the prayers and the desire for peace and tranquillity for which the yearning of the people increases every day. The desire for peace is very deep and widespread in Italy. It is very natural, and it should have been foreseen, that this eager desire for peace should not be expressed in more frequent appeals and prayers for peace – now that everybody – none excepted – see the rapidly growing danger of war;
3. L’Osservatore Romano, although printed in Italian is an organ of the Holy See, and cannot be confused with the Italian newspapers. If, at the present time, it expresses different opinions from those of the Italian papers as the Ambassador confirms it is not because the paper has changed its policy, but only because lately the Italian newspapers are trying to inflame public opinion. I do not discuss this phenomenon: I leave the responsibility for this to the people who have decided on this policy. But I must draw attention to the fact the L’Osservatore Romano cannot follow the other newspapers on the line of thought which has been imposed on them.
I have always advised L’Osservatore to be prudent, objective and moderate in its articles and in reporting the news. I have no difficulty repeating this advice, as I do from time to time.
But it would be well to reflect for a moment on the fact that if it is a duty for L’Osservatore to follow its own policy this also is in in the interest of Italy: L’Osservatore Romano will be recognised everywhere, and especially abroad, as the true, impartial, serene, independent organ of the Holy See: only under these conditions could it say, if necessary, a word of truth and justice in favour of Italy.
As he took his leave, the Ambassador wanted to assure me that Count Ciano will continue his action.
ADSS 1.279 Luigi Maglione, Sec State, to Paolo Giobbe, Netherlands.
Reference: Telegram 17 (AES 3068/40)
Location and date: Vatican, 10.04.1940
Summary statement: Holy See has no information about an imminent invasion.
Coded telegram 49 received (1). No news here regarding imminent invasion of Holland, although future danger cannot be excluded (2).
(1) ADSS 1.278.
(2) Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on 08-09.04.1940. Denmark surrendered on 10.04.1940.
ADSS 1.278 Paolo Giobbe, Hague (1), to Luigi Malgione, Sec State
Reference: Telegram 26 (AES 3068/40)
Location and date: The Hague, 09.04.1940 (arrived Rome 10.04.1940)
Summary statement: Request for information about an imminent German attack against Holland.
Events which have taken place lately, and news received, trouble this Government which, fearing imminent invasion by German troops has taken serious and urgent measures. In the supposition that the Holy See is able to give some information about this supposed threat, this Government asks me to address myself to Your Eminence for advice. Please telegraph reply (2).
(1) Paolo Giobbe (1880-1972) Internuncio to the Netherlands 1935-58.
(2) Pasquale Diana (1890-1970) Italian Ambassador to The Hague, 1938-40, commented on 11.04.1940 of the unease of Dutch political circles in the wake of the German invasion of Norway on 08-09/04.1940. DDI, Series 9, Volume 4, n47, pp33-34.
ADSS 1.277 Giovanni Montini, Secretariat of State, notes.
Reference: AES 3316/40
Location and date: Vatican, 08.04.1940
Summary statement: French Ambassador, Charles-Roux (1), has given assurance of the good intentions of the French government to the Holy See; but he has noticed a change in the Italian attitude; France prepared to negotiate. Internal situation in France.
His Excellency Charles-Roux, French Ambassador to the Holy See, returning to Rome after a short stay in Paris, says that he has see the Prime Minister, M Reynaud (2), who had assured him about the keeping of good relations with the Holy See and about ecclesiastical affairs.
He brings news about Cardinal Verdier who has had an operation and must shortly have a second one. His condition however is good and there is no cause for alarm (3).
Regarding the political situation he also noticed a stiffening of tone in the Italian
Press; and he mentions particularly, the Regime Fascista which published a violent leader against France (02.04.1940) and the Popolo d’Italia, no less insulting but with more authority (05.04.1940). He states that France is still ready to negotiate and to make a distinction between Fascism and Nazism, while Italy seems hostile to any discussion: Italy must already be planning to obtain from a vanquished or exhausted France those advantages which it is unable to obtain now through negotiations. To my remark that the proofs of the good intentions of France towards Italy are not well know to Italian public opinion, the Ambassador agrees that France would do well to clarify these good intentions.
On the Government position: the Radicals are convinced that they have made a mistake in overthrowing their leader, Daladier. It would be more logical, in fact, for the Socialists to join forces now with the other parties in an effort to get rid of Communism. He believes that the Socialists will be more loyal to the nation’s interests than to the interest of their Party (5).
(1) Francois Charles-Roux (1879-1961), French Ambassador to the Holy See 1932-40.
(2) Paul Reynaud (1878-1966), French Prime Minister, March-June 1940.
(3) Jean Verdier (1864-1940), Cardinal Archbishop of Paris 1929-40. Verdier died the following day, 09.04.1940.
(4) Edouard Daladier (1884-1970), French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 1938-40.
(5) Compare this with the message of Raffaele Guariglia (1889-1970) Italian Ambassador in Paris 1937-40. See DDI, Series 9, Volume 4, n47, pp 33-34.
ADSS 1.276 Secretariat of State Office, notes (1).
Reference: AES 2892/40
Location and date: Vatican, 04.04.1940
Summary statement: Information about the 18.03.1940 meeting between Mussolini and Hitler. Hitler asked Mussolini to send 60 divisions to the French border. Mussolini agreed to enter the war in August. Italian government is divided. Ciano defends neutrality but his position is difficult.
There are two minutes on the Brenner meeting, one in Italian and the other in German, and they report the entire discussions with the exception of the conversation between Mussolini and Hitler which tool place without witnesses (2).
M[ussolini] repeated three times: “We are ready to march with you”. The first time H[itler] did not understand. (M speaks German, but the bodyguard interpreter whom H always takes along with him and whose name the writer does not remember, was also present) (3).
H proposed that Italy should send 60 divisions to the French frontier, not to fight, but only to force France to shift part of their forces and in this way to weaken their defences. According to this plan the offensive would start on the Dutch frontier on 15 April.
M did not agree (it is possible however, that the German may go it alone).
Nevertheless M and H have agreed that Italy should enter the war by the beginning of August. Italy is short of many things, for example anti-aircraft guns, but in Munich 100 batteries are being assembled, ready to be sent to Italy and already 20 have arrived.
The tightening of the British blockade at this moment could hasten Italy’s entry into the war, perhaps by June. The blockade is a measure which M cannot tolerate.
Ciano has called the members of his Cabinet and told them that he no longer controls the course of events. On the other hand the position of Ciano could be shaken any moment, if M felt that is carrying out a personal policy.
M would appoint him Minister of the Interior, to take him away from the Foreign Office.
At the beginning of the war M had a crisis of depression lasting a few months, as at the time of the Matteotti affair, but he has now regained full activity (4).
Some are afraid that with C[iano] as Chief of Police there is a danger of a revolt in Italy, as the people are against war. M, however, does not worry about the internal situation.
Anfuso (5) will be sent as Ambassador to Berlin. Magistrati has quarrelled with C on private matters; for this reason he has been sent to Sofia (6).
M told H: “Do not become more involved with Russia because Italy wants nothing to do with Communism; and this could engager German Italian union”.
On M’s side are: Buffarini, Renato Ricci, Starace (7): all the others, and in particular the Service Ministers, stand by C – Cavagnari was with C in China when he was Charge d’Affaires (8).
A month ago C was candidate for M’s succession, and this could have happened at any moment. In those days Prince Umberto came to Rome and for a week he dined with C. The King sent Acquarone around the various Ministries to obtain information, and sent the same Acquarone (9) to C to tell him “it was not ripe” (this phrase has never been explained).
But now M has regained strength and controls decisions.
Alfieri is not regarded as much of an Ambassador; he does not send reports, while Pignatti (10) sent at least a short telegram a day to give information about the Vatican’s mood. Alfieri sent a report on his audience with the Holy Father after R[ibbentrop]’s visit. Among other things he wrote he said: The Holy Father told me that having asked R about some political matters he replied that he did not know very much about them, because the affairs of state are personally directed by H (11).
C has a personal liking for the Russian Charge d’Affaires and although he is no longer received at the Palazzo Chigi they still meet on the golf course. This man has large sums of money at his disposal and gets all he wants in the Ministries, and is very well informed. He has been occupying this position since the time when the Ambassador, owing to hostile demonstrations at the time of the attack on Finland, left in a great hurry, without even calling on the King, with whom he had an appointment (12). On that occasion, though very few people knew about it, there was even demonstrations of sympathy in front of the Finnish Legation and the Minister carried around in triumph.
M did not trust Welles because he had the impression that Welles came here for personal reasons, that is, to become Foreign Minister, after the next presidential election.
(1) Domenico Tardini wrote at the top of the Note: “Give to me by His Eminence on 03.03.1941”. It is reasonable to assume the note had originally been sent to Maglione who passed it to Tardini, even though there is nearly a year between the composition of the Note and its arrival on Tardini’s desk.
(2) Compare this with ADSS 1.272 n2. There are major differences.
(3) Possibly Eugen Dollmann (1900-1985) who had worked as a translator for different Nazi leaders from 1934. He held the SS rank of Obersturmbannfuhrer.
(4) Giacomo Matteotti (1885-1924) was an outspoken anti-fascist. He was murdered on 10.06.1924 after publishing The Fascists Exposed and publically denouncing electoral fraud in the Italian parliament. Mussolini was widely presumed to have had some involvement whoever peripheral, but there was insufficient evidence to prove it.
(5) Filippo Anfuso (1901-1963), Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff 1938-42. He was not sent to Berlin.
(6) Massimo Magistrati (1899-1971) Counsellor at the Italian Embassy Berlin 1933-40; transferred to Sofia 1940-43. He married Ciano’s sister Maria in 1930 (died 1939).
(7) Guido Buffarini (1895-1945) Italian Minister of the Interior 1940-43; Renato Ricci (1896-1956) Italian Minister of Corporations 1939-43; Achille Starace (1889-1945) former Fascist Party Secretary 1931-39, Chief of Staff for the Blackshirts 1940-43.
(8) Service Ministers most likely refers to the chiefs of Italy’s armed forces. Domenico Cavagnari (1876-1966), Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina (Italian Royal Navy) 1934-40.
(9) Pietro d’Acquarone (1890-1948), Duke and Master of the Royal House 1934-1944. He often acted as an intermediary for King Vittorio Emanuele and was known to be sympathetic to anti-Fascists. He later played a role in the dismissal of Mussolini in 1943.
(10) Dino Alfieri (1886-1966), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1939-40; Bonafacio Pignatti (1877-1957), Italian Ambassador to the Holy See 1935-39.
(11) See DDI, Series 9, Volume 3, n536, p467. According to Alfieri, Ribbentrop replied that he did not know anything and that he was not competent, but not that it was Hitler who directed all the affairs of State.
(12) Leon Helfand (1900-1961), Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Rome 1935-40 (he defected to the United States a few months later where he became Leon Moore); Boris Shtein (1892-1961), Soviet Ambassador to Italy 1935-39.